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Abstract This note questions the analysis of Diacon (2006) in the June
issue of Economics Letters. It points at a misinterpretation and claims that the
conclusion—that the presence of luxuries may make people love income gambles—is
only true if people love gambles on luxury products.
1 Introduction
In a recent paper in Economics Letters, Diacon (2006) argues that the risk lov-
ing behaviour (accepting unfair gambles) can be due to the presence of luxury
commodities in the consumer’s basket—goods which take a larger portion of the
consumer’s budget as she gets richer. Diacon’s argument is based on a decom-
position of the risk premium.
In this note I argue that Diacon’s argument is flawed by a misinterpretation
of the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion and that his conclusion is based on the
implicit assumption that the consumer is risk loving when it comes to gambles
on the luxury commodity. Risk loving behaviour is therefore not explained, but
assumed.
2 Analysis of Diacon’s arguments
Diacon describes a consumer whose preferences are represented by a strictly quasi
concave utility function defined over two goods, u(x1, x2), of which the maximi-
sation under the budget constraint p1x1+p2x2 = y, results in the maximal utility
function v(p1, p2, y). The second commodity is assumed to be a luxury (having
an income elasticity exceeding 1).
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Diacon next derives the central equation in his article, eq (7), by decomposing
the elasticity of the marginal utility of income, −vyyvy yy, into a cardinal measure
for the elasticity of the marginal utility of good 1, and an ordinal term which
involves the budget shares of both commodities (si, i = 1, 2), the income elasticity
of commodity 2 (η2), and the own Slutsky price elasticity of commodity 1 (bε11):
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The decomposition in equation (1) is not new. It was derived by Drèze
and Modigliani (1966, 1972)—in the latter paper as equation (2.9)—in the context
of the consumer’s two period intertemporal savings problem when she faces an
uncertain future income. The first rhs term is then the consumer’s (relative)
risk aversion for a delayed risk (when future consumption is labelled as good 1),
while the lhs term is the risk aversion for the same risk when timeless, i.e. if
the consumer were informed about the draw of future income before making her
savings decision. The second rhs term is then by definition the expected value
for perfect information—it is entirely ordinal.
Diacon interprets the lhs of (1) as the consumer’s coeﬃcient of relative risk
aversion and the first rhs term as the analogous coeﬃcient "in a one good world"
(p 405). Since he does not specify the risks facing the consumer, it is not clear at
all why the lhs of (1) should be given this interpretation. If the risk is an income
risk, then the only correct interpretation of (1) is that the willingness to pay for
avoiding a timeless income risk is smaller than the willingness to pay for avoiding
a delayed income risk when part of her income is already committed to commodity
2. If there is any term in (1) that deserves the interpretation of risk aversion
"in a one good world", it is the lhs since there is no relative price uncertainty.
Eq (1) then tells us that the relative risk premium for gambles on commodity 1
exceeds the relative risk premium for income gambles with the value for perfect
information.
Diacon finally makes the point that "in those cases where good two is a
bundle of luxuries, the expenditure share of good 1 (s1) becomes small as income
increases so that the second term could [on the rhs of (1)] dominate the first
at high income levels." (pp 404-405). This analysis invites for two comments.
First, it is silent what happens to the first rhs term and to the elasticities as
income grows and s1 falls. It is well known that only Cobb-Douglas preferences
yield constant income and price elasticities. But under these preferences the
budget shares remain constant as well, not leaving any room for luxury goods..
The inference from (1) is thus a first approximiation. Second, it begs for the
question where the negative risk aversion for timeless income risk comes from.
For this purpose it is useful to look at the alternative decomposition of this risk
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aversion, now in terms of aversion to gambles on commodity 2:
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Keeping elasticities constant to a first approximation, (2) tells us that −vyyvy y
will approach −u22u2 x2, the relative risk aversion for the luxury good, as s2 grows.
Hence if −vyyvy y becomes negative it must be because the consumer has a negative
willingness to pay to avoid gambles on the luxury good. It is then of no surprise
that she will also display a preference for timeless income risk as she gets richer.
The important issue—an empirical one, on which Diacon remains silent—is then
to which extent a consumer is less risk averse towards gambles on luxury goods
than towards other commodities.
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